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From Prohibition to Mandate:
The Problem of Cost in Environmental Regulation
Cameron Franey*
INTRODUCTION
Cost consideration during the promulgation of
environmental regulation rulings should be neither prohibited
nor required without a direct Congressional mandate. Flexibility
in environmental rulings would allow the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to bring a fresh approach to each new
rule without shackling it to one blanket interpretation for cost
consideration.
Absent express Congressional mandates, federal agencies
possess moderate rulemaking flexibility.' This administrative
latitude can swing for or against agencies.2 In the context of
environmental regulation, environmentalists and the energy
industry regularly disagree over whether cost considerations are
reasonably read into otherwise silent statutes and administrative
rules promulgated by the EPA. 3 The Supreme Court's
interpretation of cost consideration through various analyses of
environmental regulations has evolved beginning with Whitman
v. American Trucking Association, which held that cost
consideration is prohibited during the setting of the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). 4 Later, Environmental
Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation held that cost
consideration was allowed through the "Transport Rule" at the
discretion of the EPA.5 Most recently, its holding in Michigan v.
Environmental Protection Agency essentially created a mandate
requiring the EPA to consider cost when regulating hazardous air
* Senior Staff Editor, KY. J. OF EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L., 2017-
2019; B.A. 2013, W. Ky. Univ.; J.D. May 2019, Univ. of Ky.
I Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
2See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. 489, 519-20 (2014);
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-07 (2015).
3See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 464-65 (2001); EME
Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 504-05; Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
4Am. TruckingAss'n, 531 U.S. at 471.
5 EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 519.
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pollutants from factories.6 These shifts from prohibition to
mandate lean on Chevron deference7-along with other
interpretive methods such as expressio unius-to reach vastly
different outcomes when it comes to cost consideration. These
varying outcomes muddle environmental regulations and lead to
an opaque rulemaking process when the EPA attempts to
promulgate rules based on environmental regulations.8
Cost consideration in environmental regulation sparks an
important debate because industries, in general, must use cost to
determine how active to be in the regulation of their emissions or
discharges.9 The general consensus is that if cost is considered
during the rulemaking process, the rule will ultimately be more
industry-friendly and less protective of the environment.0 Justice
Stephen Breyer succinctly explains the reasoning behind pro-cost
consideration, saying it is necessary "in order to better achieve
regulatory goals" by taking into account a proposed regulation's
adverse effects." Justice Breyer's reference to taking adverse
effects into account is indicative of his support of cost
consideration.12  In the event cost is not considered,
environmental regulations are focused predominately on reaching
a goal that is typically health-based.13 Because compliance can be
required without taking into account adverse effects on the
industry or its capacity to meet the requirements without going
out of business, health-based regulations are tougher on
industries against which regulations can be enforced.14
6Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
7 When applying Chevron deference, courts defer to reasonable agency
interpretation of statutes in the event Congress has not directly addressed the issue at
hand. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). For a more in-depth
analysis of Chevron deference, see Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as
a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency
Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1727 (2010).
8 See Rachel Kenigsberg, Note, Convenient Textualism: Justice Scalia's Legacy
in Environmental Law, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 418, 440-41 (2016); Michael A. Livermore &
Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards and Cost Benefit
Analysis, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10674, 10677 (2016).
9 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental
Regulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1237, 1247 (2002).
1o Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10674.
"i Cf, Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. at 490 (Breyer, J. concurring).
12 
PiercC, supra note 9, at 1247-48.
13 Amy Sinden, A "Cost-Benefit State"? Reports of its Birth Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10933, 10937 (2016).
14Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10675.
COST IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
This Note analyzes the evolution of the Court's dissimilar
holdings in American Trucking, EME Homer City Generation,
and Michigan. It argues that the deferential approach reached in
EME Homer City Generation adheres best to the Chevron
deference standard. Part I provides background on why cost
consideration is an important issue and how certain approaches
to cost consideration create specific problems within
environmental regulation. Part II breaks down each of the three
approaches, including a look at how various courts have followed
the approaches, the benefits that each approach provides, and
how each uses the Chevron standard to justify its conclusion.
Part III proposes that the deferential approach, regardless of the
inclusion of cost consideration, is the approach that best utilizes
the Chevron standard and carries out the intent of environmental
regulations most efficiently.
I. COST CONSIDERATION BACKGROUND
Cost consideration comes in many forms, from open-ended
balancing to the much stricter cost-benefit analysis.15 An open-
ended balancing approach allows the EPA to consider many
factors, including cost.1 6 This type of analysis provides the EPA
with greater flexibility to consider cost with no prerequisite
weight against other factors defined by Congress, or factors that
are relevant to that specific pollutant.17 Another commonly used
approach for cost consideration is a feasibility analysis." This
approach examines the economic and technological feasibility of
compliance, by weighing the costs the industry must undertake
against its financial capacity.19 The feasibility approach, however,
ignores the social benefits that arise from environmental
regulation.20 Finally, the last prominent cost consideration
approach is cost-benefit analysis.21 Although cost-benefit analysis
is not regularly used in environmental regulation, it has its fair
is Sinden, supra note 13, at 10935-40.
161d. at 10939.
17 Id.
18 d. at 10937.
19 Id.
20 I
21Id. at 10935.
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share of proponents.2 2 While cost-benefit analysis can have
multiple meanings, the basic principle is to compare positives and
negatives to reach a fair outcome.23 In the context of
environmental regulation, the benefits of regulation on health
and the environment are weighed against the industry's cost in
reaching the benefits.2 4
Cost consideration, specifically cost-benefit analysis, may
be seen as anti-protectionist and environmentalists have often
avoided discussions on the topic in regulatory groups.25 Some
argue that since cost-benefit analysis is here to stay post-
Michigan v. EPA, half of the major players in the environmental
regulation game are left on the sideline.2 6 The Obama
Administration's acceptance of cost-benefit analysis, as well as
the recession in 2008, has caused some nvironmentalist groups
to more fully embrace the approach, but some still negatively
view cost-benefit analysis and argue for a health-based
approach.2 7 Also, cost is not specifically limited to the monetary
value of the regulated industry's ability to comply with the rule.2 8
The agency is given the power to determine all costs facing the
regulated industry within reason.2 9 Although cost of compliance is
the most important factor to be weighed when cost consideration
is allowable, the agency must still determine what other non-
monetary costs the industry mayface.3 0
Two problems arise when cost is not considered in setting
emissions standards: (1) the stopping-point problem and (2) the
inadequacy paradox.31 The stopping-point problem addresses
eradicating a public health risk caused by pollution by requiring
the elimination of all emissions when cost cannot be considered.32
221d. at 10933-35.
23Id. at 10935-36.
24 See id. at 10936.
25 
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years
Later, 48 Hous. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011).
26 Cass R. Sunstein, Thanks, Justice Scalia, for the Cost-Benefit State,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 7, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-07-07/thanks-justice-scalia-for-the-cost-
benefit-state (last visited Apr. 15, 2019).
27 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 5, at 26-27.
28See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (2015).
29 Id.
3o Id.
31 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10674.
32 Id.
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Because of the stopping-point problem, the EPA could
theoretically set emission standards atzero.33
The second problem when cost is not considered is the
inadequacy paradox, which arose after American Trucking, where
the EPA set less stringent ambient air quality standards despite
the prohibition against considering costs.3 4 The first explanation
for the inadequacy paradox is a bias toward overly weak health-
based standards in order to avoid ancillary effects, where
regulating one pollutant affects the emissions of another, since
health-based standards do not take the ancillary effects into
account like cost considerations would.3 5 The second explanation
for the inadequacy paradox is that the EPA is skeptical about
setting standards that are too stringent, which may impose
excessive costs on emitters without taking the impact of those
costs into consideration.3 6
According to a series of executive orders, the EPA is
required to use a cost-benefit analysis during rulemaking if the
statute does not clearly state the factors to be taken into
consideration when setting the rules or if the statute does not
limit the extent that cost can be taken into account.37 Ultimately,
if a statute does not legally prohibit an agency from applying a
cost-benefit analysis, then a cost-benefit analysis must be
undertaken during the rulemaking process to determine whether
the benefits of the rule outweigh the costs imposed on the
industry.3 8 This requirement of a cost-benefit analysis in light of
no other legally binding approach was established by Executive
Order 13563 by President Barack Obama's administration.3 9
When cost must be considered, the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)-a branch of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)-reviews agencies' work to
determine whether cost is being considered in their rulemaking
33Id
3
4 Id.
3sM. at 10678-79.
3 6
Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10679.
37 Daniel A. Farber, Taking Costs into Account: Mapping the Boundaries of
Judicial and Agency Discretion, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 87, 99 (2016).
38 See, e.g., id.; Cass R. Sunstein, The Office ofInformation and Regulatory
Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1846 (2013).
39Sunstein, supra note 3838, at 1845-46.
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and whether the cost-benefit analyses undertaken by the agency
is satisfactory.40
As mentioned earlier, in the event cost is not considered in
environmental regulation, the main alternative is the health-
based standard.4 1 Following this approach, the EPA sets
standards based entirely on the consideration of human health
effects or environmental impact with no consideration of cost.4 2
The goal in health-based standards is to eliminate a public health
risk or, if that is impossible, to reduce the risk to an acceptable
level.4 3 The health-based standard fails to weigh risks with
rivaling social priorities (e.g. costs) against health advancements,
which differ entirely from the cost-benefit standard." It also
differs from a feasibility analysis because it is not beholden to the
regulated industry's capacity to meet the regulation without
going out of business.45
II. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES COST CONSIDERATION
The Supreme Court has used three approaches when
deciding if cost should be considered when the EPA promulgates
rules for the Clean Air Act. The first is the prohibition approach
from American Trucking where the EPA is prohibited from
considering costs.4 6 The second is the deferential approach from
EME Homer City Generation where the EPA is given the
flexibility to decide whether cost should be considered.4 7 Finally,
the third approach is the cost consideration mandate from
Michigan where the EPA is required to consider costs as a
factor.48
Each conclusion was justified using the Chevron
analysis.4 9 The deferential approach, however, best follows the
Chevron analysis and provides the EPA with the greatest amount
4Id. at 1845-46.
41 Sinden, supra note 13, at 10937.
42 Id
43 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10675.
4 Id.
45 Id.
46See Am. Trucking Ass'n., 531 U.S. at 471 (2001).
47 See EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 518-24 (2014).
4See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (2015).
49See, e.g. id. at 2706-07; Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. at 579; EME Homer City
Generation, 572 U.S. at 513.
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of flexibility when deciding the unique question of whether cost
should be considered when promulgating rules under the Act.
Unlike the other two approaches, being deferential to the EPA
allows the agency to be flexible and approach each rulemaking
based on the unique challenges each situation presents.
A. The Prohibition Approach
In American Trucking, the Supreme Court prohibited the
EPA from considering costs when setting National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for state compliance with the Clean
Air Act (CAA). 50 The NAAQS requirement is set out in § 109(b) of
the CAA, which establishes primary standards necessary for
protecting public health and secondary standards for
safeguarding public welfare.51 No other considerations are
provided in the statute outside the public health and welfare
thresholds.5 2 The statute does, however, allow for an adequate
margin of safety when setting the standards.53
Justice Antonin Scalia explained in his majority opinion in
American Trucking that the use of "public health" and "public
welfare" were clear enough to preclude the EPA from considering
cost when setting NAAQS. 54 The focus of the analysis in
American Trucking is on the plain meaning of the primary
standard's requisite consideration-public health.55 Justice Scalia
used the plain meaning of "health" to determine that such a
meaning prohibits cost considerations, holding that cost cannot
be considered when determining "the health of the community."56
Using the expressio unius interpretive canon, Justice Scalia
reasoned that Congress meant to preclude cost considerations
because other environmental statutes unambiguously require the
consideration of cost and § 109(b) of the CAA does not express
this requirement.57 This approach is clearly contrary to the
method currently enforced by the administrative agency, where a
50Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. at 471.
51 Clean Air Act § 109(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-
281).
52 Id
53 Id.
54Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. at 465-66.
s5 Id.
56Id
57Id at 466-67.
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cost-benefit analysis must be considered in light of no other
legally binding consideration.5 8
Justice Scalia's holding in American Trucking created a
health-based standard in § 109(b).5 9 As mentioned above, the
focus of § 109(b) as a health-based standard becomes the
elimination of a public health risk with no consideration of any
other factors-either economic or technological.6 0 This leads to the
stopping point problem and the inadequacy paradox mentioned in
the introduction.61 As a result of the stopping point problem, the
EPA must set NAAQS without being able to weigh many of the
factors that it would otherwise find beneficial in making such a
determination, forcing the EPA to analyze only one side of a
multifaceted issue.6 2 Logically, the EPA should be able to set
NAAQS in a way that would completely eliminate the health
risks at issue, but instead, the EPA opts to settle for something
less than full elimination of the health risk.63 The impression is
that it is weighing other factors, but is unable to report those
factors under the American Trucking holding, which creates a
gap between the EPA's decision-making process and the final
rule.6 4 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the
stopping-point issue with the health-based standard in American
Trucking and held § 109(b) unconstitutional for lack of
guidance.6 5 Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C.
Circuit's holding, opting instead for the prohibition approach.66
This decision is viewed as a victory for environmentalists
seeking protective regulation despite its imposition ofundue costs
on the regulated industry.6 7 It bars the EPA from taking into
account any factors that it might otherwise use to set the
threshold for pollutants at a level above zero.68 Without these
factors, the industry could be regulated out of business while
51 Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1846.
59 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. & ELIZABETH BURLESON, RODGERS ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, 2D. § 6:3, Legal Confirmation of the Public Health Goals, Westlaw (database updated
November 2018).
0 Sinden, supra note 13, at 10937.
61 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10674.
62d. at 10675.
63d. at 10677.
6Id. at 10677.
65 d. at 10677.
6Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10677.
67d. at 10674.
68Id. at 10677.
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trying to achieve compliance with such low thresholds set at the
discretion of the EPA.
An example of the American Trucking health-based
environmental regulation can be observed in Association of
IrritatedResidents v. San Joaquin Valley UnifiedAir Pollution
Control District.6 9 InIrritatedResidents, the San JoaquinValley
Unified Air Pollution Control District ("the district") sought
compliance with a regulation requiring air contaminants from
agriculture to be reduced through the enactment of a permit
process where facilities had to choose from a variety of mitigation
options to reduce contaminants.70 This reduction was meant to
help improve an area's ambient air quality that had not yet
reached NAAQS attainment.71 The residents challenged the
process because it failed to take health effects into account during
the analysis of the issue.72
Unlike the statute in American Trucking, the regulation
in Irritated Residents allows for cost consideration in the
rulemaking process.73 The court sided with the residents, stating
that under their interpretation of American Trucking, the true
goal of the CAA-including the NAAQS-is public welfare.74
Because the process at issue here was meant to help satisfy the
NAAQS, health effects must be considered using a health-effects
assessment in light of the CAA's primary goal of public welfare
under American Trucking.75 Despite the requisite consideration
of costs, lack of an assessment of health benefits controlled in
Irritated Citizens because the court viewed American Trucking's
holding as clearly indicative of a health-based standard where
public health rises above all other considerations.7 6 This case
exemplifies the power of a health-based standard, under which
the court overruled a reasoned decision by the rulemaking body of
this district because it did not put enough emphasis on health
impact-despite its consideration of cost.7 7
69See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution
Control Dist., 168 Cal. App. 4th 535, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
701d. at 541-42.
71 Id. at 547.
72 Id. at 542.
73 Id. at 5 44.
74See Ass'n ofIrritated Residents, 168 Cal. App. 4th at 547.
75 Id
76 Id
77Id. at 557.
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However, after American Trucking, NAAQS are actually
set with less stringency than they would have been if cost had
been considered.7 8 This is known as the inadequacy paradox.79
For fear of excessive costs on regulated industries or lack of
consideration of the possible ancillary benefits, the EPA has
promulgated less stringent NAAQS than it otherwise would if
cost consideration were evaluated as a factor during the
rulemaking process.8 0 The EPA appears to be worried that
promulgating stringent NAAQS to entirely eliminate the health
risks of pollutants-which would be justified after American
Trucking-would have enormous economic impact on regulated
industries.8 ' These factors are yet another illustration of
instances in which the EPA seemingly takes cost into
consideration without officially reporting it, further contributing
to the opacity of the EPA's decision-making process while setting
NAAQS. 82
The Supreme Court could have upheld the D.C. Circuit's
decision to strike the statute due to its ambiguity, allowing a
reformed statute that would better address the issue of NAAQS
standards.8 3 Additionally, the Supreme Court could have better
used Chevron to defer to the EPA's expertise on factors that
should be examined when setting NAAQS to avoid the stopping-
point problem and fill in the gaps made by the EPA weighing
factors unofficially. 84 The EPA could institute a much more
transparent process leading to more sound results if it had the
ability to officially weigh factors other than health effects,
contrary to the holding in American Trucking.8 5
Ultimately, the Supreme Court's prohibition of cost
consideration is under-inclusive considering the many unique and
various issues the EPA must balance during environmental
regulation. By prohibiting cost considerations, the Supreme Court
created a more ambiguous decision-making process that does not
allow the EPA to be as transparent as it otherwise could be.
7 8Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10674.
7Id
sold at 10678-79.
81 d at 10679.
82 Id
8 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10677.
84 See id.
s See id.
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B. The Deferential Approach
The Supreme Court took a different approach from
American Trucking in EME Homer City Generation, decided
thirteen years after American Trucking.86 In EME Homer City
Generation, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg allowed the EPA's cost
consideration approach despite a lack of specific guidance from
the controlling statute.87 In EME Homer City Generation, the
Court faced the issue of interstate air pollution that caused
downwind states to be in violation of their NAAQS attainment
requirements due to upwind states' activities."8 As discussed in
EME Homer Generation, without Congress stepping in to control
interstate air pollution with the "Good Neighbor Provision,"
upwind states are able to free ride off of the natural movement of
air pollution to downwind states, allowing them to reach NAAQS
attainment with less effort and costs compared to downwind
states.89 The Good Neighbor Provision requires states to set
standards for meeting NAAQS requirements through State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) which should prohibit activity that
significantly contributes to nonattainment in a downwind state or
interferes with the maintenance of any rule promulgated by the
EPA.90 From the Good Neighbor Provision, the EPA promulgated
the Transport Rule which, among other factors, requires cost
consideration in determining the reduction of emissions in an
upwind state that significantly contributes to a downwind state's
NAAQS nonattainment.91
Unlike American Trucking, the majority in EME Homer
City Generation relied on Chevron deference to uphold the
Transport Rule's cost consideration-despite the Good Neighbor
Rule's ambivalence toward the EPA's mandated considerations
when approving a SIP.92 The Court held that the Transport Rule's
cost considerations were not arbitrary or capricious in this
instance because it was an efficient and equitable solution to the
86 See EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 518-24.
87d. at519-20.
8 8 1d. at495-96.
89Id.
90 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
91 EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 495.
921d. at 519-20.
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problem.93 Ultimately, the Court deferred to the EPA's expertise
during the rulemaking process to fill in the gap Congress left in
an ambiguous statute.94
Similar to American Trucking, EME Homer City
Generation is an example of the Supreme Court reversing the
D.C. Circuit's decision.95 However, unlike American Trucking, the
Court in EME Homer City Generation recognized the ambiguity
of the Good Neighbor Provision and gave deference to the EPA
instead of viewing that ambiguity as prohibiting the EPA from
exercising deference in its interpretation of the statute.9 6 In
contrast to the decision in American Trucking, the Supreme
Court allowed the EPA to use its expertise to decide how to best
analyze factors that include cost, in absence of specific,
unambiguous language from Congress in the CAA. 97 As Justice
Ginsburg writes in EME Homer City Generation, "[u]sing costs in
the Transport Rule calculus . . . makes good sense."98 Using such
a deferential approach in this instance permitted the EPA to
come to an efficient and equitable solution to the allocation
problem that arises from the Good Neighbor Provision, rather
than forcing the EPA to act in a specific manner that would go
against the Court's decision in Chevron.99
Another example of the Court's deference to the EPA's
expertise can be seen in the holding of Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper Inc.100 In Entergy, the Court tackled the issue of
whether it was permissible for the EPA to use and consider a cost-
benefit analysis when setting rules for power plants using water
intake pipes to draw water from outside sources and cool their
facilities, ultimately aimed at decreasing the deaths of
93I. at 519.
9
4 Id. at 519-20.
9s Id. at 524.
96 Id. at 519-20.
9 Compare EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 489 (holding that the
EPA's decision to consider cost in interpreting the Transport Rule and Good Neighbor
Provision are reasonable interpretations of the statute and satisfy Chevron), with Am.
Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the text in §
109(b) bars the EPA from considering costs when setting NAAQS), and Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'n., 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (agreeing with the D.C. Circuit that the text of §
109(b) unambiguously bars the EPA from considering costs in the NAAQS-setting
process).
98 EME Homer City Generation, 572 U.S. at 519.
99Id. at 519-20.
1"Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009).
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billions of aquatic organisms per year caused by being trapped
against the cooling screens (impingement) or being sucked into
the cooling system (entrainment).0 1 The Clean Water Act (CWA)
mandates that the EPA establish standards requiring "the
location, design, construction, and capacity of water intake
structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact."1 02 In response to the CWA, the
EPA used a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether power
plants whose water intake flow is more than 50 million gallons of
water per day-at least 25 percent of which is used for cooling-
meet performance standards (known as the Phase II rules) by
lowering the impingement and entrainment caused by their
water intake pipeS.103 Requiring such facilities to transition to
closed-cycle cooling systems would have significantly reduced
impingement and entrainment.104 However, after all factors
between the available alternatives were considered, the use of
remedial technology to meet performance standards survived the
cost-benefit analysis while the transition to closed-cycle cooling
systems did not. 0 5
The Entergy Court, through the words of Justice Scalia,
held that the Phase II rules were a permissible interpretation of an
ambiguous statute by satisfying a Chevron analysis.10 6
Although the Phase II rules-promulgated after the completion of
a cost-benefit analysis-were not the only approach available to
the EPA or the most reasonable as determined by the courts, they
were at least permissible.107
Perhaps most interesting is Justice Scalia's remarks
distinguishing Entergy from American Trucking.108 In the
majority opinion, Justice Scalia differentiates American
Trucking's holding-which would seemingly control the Court in
Entergy because the statutes at issue were similarly vague-by
relying on the statutory context of the CAA.1 09 The CAA as a
whole was given more weight by the Court in American Trucking,
101 Id. at 212-15.
102 33 U.S.C.A. § 1326(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-8).
0 3Entergy, 556 U.S. at 215.
0MId. at 215-16.
losd.
16d. at 217-18.
107d. at 218.
08 See Entergy, 556 U.S. at 223.
109 Id.
223
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where it justified the prohibition of cost consideration, while the
Court in Entergy upheld the EPA's cost-benefit analysis by
considering, though ultimately ignoring, other provisions of the
CWA.i1 0 Justice Scalia acknowledges the fallacy in his holding by
recognizing that similar statutory standards applicable to point
sources-like the power plants at issue in Entergy-expressly
authorize cost-benefit analyses, while the standard at issue in
Entergy does not."'1 As the dissent argues, the inference that
could be drawn from this statutory silence is an intent to forbid a
cost-benefit analysis, which would put this case on all fours with
the holding in American Trucking.112 However, Justice Scalia
avoids this interpretation by claiming the inferences one can
draw from the above statutory silence is implausible when put
into context with the other sections of the CWA.113 The
discrepancy left behind by the two holdings provides strong
evidence that one of the two decisions is less effective than the
other. In light of Chevron deference, the holding in American
Trucking should look more like the holding in Entergy in order to
provide consistency between the two and to provide deference to
the EPA's expertise in rulemaking.
The deferential approach is the best tactic the Supreme
Court can take toward EPA's environmental regulation. By
deferring to the EPA's expertise, the Supreme Court allows for
consideration of the various issues the EPA faces when
rulemaking and, as time persists, allows for the shifting of public
opinion toward environmental regulation. With all things
considered, the deferential approach allows for flexibility, where
not deferring to the EPA would be too extreme and final.
C. The Mandate Approach
Opposite from the prohibition approach, yet just as
restrictive, is the mandate approach the Supreme Court ook in
Michigan v. EPA only one year after EME Homer City
Generation.l14 Under the mandate approach, the Supreme Court
required the EPA to consider costs in some capacity when it
0 Id. at 222-23.
111 Id. at 212-13, 220-22.
112Id. at 222-23.
113 See Entergy, 556 U.S. at 222-23.
114See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (2015).
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interpreted an ambiguous section of the CAA. 11 5 Through this
approach, the Court essentially barred the EPA from ignoring
cost in favor of a health-based approach.' 16
In Michigan v. EPA, the Court decided the agency acted
inappropriately when it ignored costs entirely in determining
whether emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) from
power plants should be regulated under the CAA." 7 The statute
in dispute only requires EPA action if it finds regulation is
"appropriate and necessary."'18 To determine whether regulating
the emission of HAPs is "appropriate and necessary," the EPA
must complete a study as outlined in the statute and act only
after considering the results of the study.19 Once the EPA
determines that power plants can be regulated under the CAA,
the EPA divides the sources into categories and subcategories in
accordance with the statute.120 Next, the EPA sets minimum
emissions regulations for each category and subcategory, also
known as floor standards.121 The EPA has the authority to set
even stricter standards, known as "beyond-the-floor standards,"
but cost consideration is required by the statute when the agency
formulates stricter guidelines.12 2
The issue in Michigan arose after the EPA deemed the
regulation of coal and oil-fired power plants as "appropriate and
necessary," but the floor standards that followed failed to account
for the significant increase in costs to power plants that would
result from these standards.1 2 3 The EPA later acknowledged that
cost could have been considered due to the ambiguity of the
statute, but the regime chose to emphasize the regulatory
benefits to public health and the environment instead.124
The Court was ultimately unconvinced by the EPA's
interpretation of the statute and held that disregarding cost was
115Id. at 2707, 2711.
116 Id.
1171d. at 2704-06, 2712.
118 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-281);
Michigan 135 S. Ct. at 2704.
11942 U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705.
12042 U.S.C.A. § 7412(c)(1); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705.
121 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(3); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at2705.
122 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(2); Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705.
123 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705.
124d. at 2706.
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inappropriate.12 5 Justice Scalia relied on evidence of
approximately $10 billion annually incurred by the power
industry-an overwhelming cost that would be irrational to
ignore when setting industry standards.12 6 The Court also used
statutory context to bolster its holding.1 2 7 Other sections of the
statute require the EPA to consider cost when setting
standards.12 8 These aforementioned sections were used as
additional proof of Congress's intent for cost to be considered
when determining industry standards, even absent express
legislative mandate.12 9
Although the statutory foundation in American Trucking
and Michigan v. EPA is substantially similar, Justice Scalia's
Michigan v. EPA holding almost entirely departs from his
majority opinion in American Trucking, in what appears to be an
effort to require agencies to consider costs when creating
standards.13 0 Because Michigan v. EPA is the most recent opinion
on cost consideration in environmental regulation, the case's
holding has led some to declare the U.S. a "cost-benefit state."1 3 1
The result is that all regulation from federal agencies must face
the rigors of a cost-benefit analysis when certain congressional
language is used.13 2 Although the Court allowed the EPA's cost
consideration in both EME Homer City Generation and Entergy,
Michigan v. EPA is the first instance in which the Court required
an agency to consider cost against their wishes.1 3 3
Some scholars have interpreted the ruling in Michigan v.
EPA to put to rest any semblance of a presumption against cost
that remained from EME Homer City and Entergy.134 They
consider Michigan v. EPA as casting EME Homer City and
Entergy's deferential decisions as unreasonable in the light of
Michigan v. EPA's clear mandate of cost consideration.'3 1
1251d. at2707-08.
1261d. at2706-07.
1271d. at 2708.
128 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708.
I29Id.
3 0
Kenigsberg, supra note 8.
131 Sunstein, supra note 24.
1321d.
133 Sinden, supra note 13, at 10933-34.
134 Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for Agencies to Consider
Costs, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 281, 294(2015).
135 Id.
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Further, those who maintain this view argue that Michigan v.
EPA narrows American Trucking's holding to instances where
the CAA lists factors excluding cost, thus employing expressio
unius.136 These ideas give Michigan v. EPA great authority by
silently overruling EME Homer City and Entergy and narrowing
American Trucking in favor of cost consideration when dealing
with ambiguous statutes.13 7
Proof of the confusion can be seen in Kentucky Coal
Association, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority.'3 8 In that case,
members of a regulated industry tried to use Michigan v. EPA as
a bludgeon by requiring that the cheapest monetary outcome of a
cost-benefit analysis be the ultimate choice made by the agency in
the decision-making process.139 The Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), a public power company serving the Southeastern region
of the United States, was asked by the EPA to reduce emissions
from one of its coal-fired power plants in Kentucky.140 To
accomplish this, the TVA had to decide between retrofitting the
plant with new pollution controls or change the fuel source from
coal to natural gas.141 After completing an environmental
analysis, TVA decided to alter the fuel source-much to the ire of
the Kentucky Coal Association. 142
Retrofitting the plant with new pollution controls was the
more cost-effective decision.143 The Kentucky Coal Association
argued that the retrofitting plan was required under Michigan v.
EPA because it was cheaper than switching to natural gas, and
because TVA was violating the Supreme Court's mandate by
proceeding with the change.144 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed, reminding the Kentucky Coal Association that "cost
effective" is not necessarily what is cheapest in terms of dollars
and cents.145 Harms to human health and the environment are
also "cost effective" considerations agencies look at when
136 Id.
13 7 See id. at 294, 310-11.
13 8 See Kentucky Coal Ass'n, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 804 F.3d 799,
802-03 (6th Cir. 2015).
13 9 Id.
1401d. at 801.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Tennessee Valley Authority, 804 F.3d at 802.
144 Id.
145
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proceeding with a certain decision.146 Since TVA took into
consideration all of the costs-from monetary to health-related
and environmental costs-it was justified in adopting the more
environmentally friendly natural gas changeover.147
Kentucky Coal Association clearly misunderstood Justice
Scalia's opinion in Michigan v. EPA requiring cost considerations.
With the finality of cases like Michigan v. EPA, it is easier for
individuals to misinterpret the holding and try to apply it in less
than ideal ways, as was evident in Kentucky Coal Association.
However, if the Supreme Court deferred to the EPA in Michigan
v. EPA, situations like this would not develop because there
would be no requirement that agencies consider costs. Like the
prohibition approach, the Supreme Court's mandate of cost
consideration is too final for environmental regulation. Requiring
cost consideration causes confusion and does not take into
account the various situations that the EPA faces when
approaching environmental regulation.
III. THE DEFERENTIAL APPROACH IS THE TRUEST TO CHEVRON
Chevron requires deference to the rulemaking agency
when Congress is silent or ambiguous in its statutory
construction, so long as the agency's rules are based on a
permissible interpretation of the statute.148 Both the prohibition
and mandate approaches remove that deference from the EPA
despite each facing a seemingly ambiguous statute.14 9 State Farm
requires reasonableness a  the threshold standard in the agency
rule.1 50 Reasonableness is established when the rule is neither
arbitrary nor capricious.1 5' The Court should not foreclose the
option of cost consideration or require costs be considered in the
light of full, reasoned decisions by the EPA. The Court, therefore,
should lean more heavily on the deferential approach and
determine if the EPA has acted reasonably based on the evidence
146
1d. at 802.
4
7Id. at 803.
141 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984).
1
4 9 See Am. Trucking Ass'n., 531 U.S. at 487-88 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705-07 (2015).
10Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 54-55 (1983).
15 ld. at 41-43.
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and circumstances, without the finality that American Trucking
and Michigan provide. Under this approach, instead of forcing the
EPA to accept a rule indefinitely, the rulemaking undergoes an
analysis and decision-making process. This results in a more just
outcome for both environmentalists and industry participants,
while keeping in line with the spirit of Chevron deference.
The holdings in American Trucking and Michigan v. EPA,
which create a prohibition and a mandate, respectively, muddle
statutes that are seemingly similar, but ultimately reach
different outcomes.152 Justice Scalia famously wrote in his
majority in American Trucking that Congress does not "hide
elephants in mouseholes."l53 However, the Court places an
elephant directly into a mousehole in Michigan v. EPA by
mandating cost consideration in an ambiguous statute.154 By
relying more consistently on Chevron deference, the Court could
avoid this dilemma entirely by deciding whether the agency's
decision was arbitrary or capricious, dodging unreasonable
limitations on the EPA. This approach emphasizes the agency's
expertise, allows for regulations to match societal norms as
different administrators are ushered in and out, and simplifies
statutes.
Deferring to the EPA in this manner has the added benefit
of being able to adjust to changing public opinion as the EPA
evolves. With Supreme Court decisions like American Trucking
and Michigan v. EPA, the cost consideration stance will not
change unless the statute at issue is repealed or replaced, or the
Supreme Court issues a new ruling. By deferring to the EPA, the
Supreme Court gives the EPA autonomy to change its rules based
on the evolving administrations. This approach is more flexible
and allows changes to rules with much less effort than would be
required under American Trucking and Michigan v. EPA.
Cost consideration prohibitions and mandates leave no
room for attention to the economic state of the regulated industry
at the time of the regulation. For example, a cost consideration
prohibition during an economic downturn would likely lead to
health-based standards that would be more rigorous than an
industry could handle and would lead to negative externalities
152 Kenigsberg, supra note 8 at 441.
53Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. at 468 (2001).
154 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
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not intended by the agency. Additionally, while cleaning up the
environment, an agency may inadvertently cause business
closures, job losses, and increase its prices for whatever products
the industry is producing at the time. If this scenario occurs while
the economy is struggling, it would be avoidable if the EPA could
consider cost during its rulemaking process. On the other hand, a
cost consideration mandate during an economic upturn could be
manipulated by industry if environmentalist groups refuse to
take part in discussions, as they often do.155 In this case, the
regulated industry's efforts could place greater weight on the cost
of regulation without greater consideration of the industry's
capacity for more protective regulation during times of economic
success. The EPA's decision not to take cost into consideration in
this instance would arguably be justified because the industry
could afford to have greater egulation enforced upon it to achieve
more robust health-based protections.
Another issue facing a cost consideration prohibition, or a
cost consideration mandate, is the state of public health and the
environmental status at the time of regulation. Much like the
economic analysis above, a deferential approach allows the EPA
to put more weight on necessary factors that depend on the state
of public health and the environment as a result of the regulated
industry's pollution at the time of regulation.15 6
In the event a cost consideration prohibition is in place, as
was seen in American Trucking, the EPA has wide-reaching
authority to regulate a particular business to the brink of
extinction if the environment or public health so require it. Under
a deferential approach, the EPA could recognize the necessity for
significant environmental regulation, while still exercising
discretion in implementing rules that do not require an industry
to suffer too greatly as a result of promulgated rules.
Furthermore, a deferential standard permits the EPA to openly
include cost in its analysis as opposed to the analyses completed
after American Trucking, where it seems as if the EPA included
cost as part of its rulemaking but was barred from reporting it.1 57
Again, this would make the EPA's rulemaking process more
transparent, which would be beneficial to both the regulated
155 Livermore & Revesz, supra note 25, at 27.
156Livermore & Revesz, supra note 8, at 10677.
'15Id. at 10677.
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industry and the public at large. Another issue arises if the EPA
continues to struggle with the "inadequacy paradox" as a result of
the prohibition.'5 8 If the "inadequacy paradox" continues, the
EPA will be less likely to regulate to the appropriate level for fear
that it is imposing burdensome costs on the regulated industry.' 5 9
In contrast, if a cost consideration mandate is in place, the
EPA has limited authority to regulate in the face of a widespread
public health or environmental degradation issue caused by
pollution from the regulated industry.160 Here, the EPA must
regulate only to the extent that it does not overpower the
industry, despite taking the necessary steps to control pollution
for the betterment of public health and the environment. If the
EPA's expertise is deferred to, it will have greater flexibility to
put the appropriate weight on cost, while maintaining the
autonomy to do what is necessary to reign in the polluting
industry and protect public health and the environment.
Under a deferential standard, like those employed in EME
Homer City Generation and Entergy, the EPA could put more
weight on necessary factors by taking into consideration the
social climate toward environmental regulation, economic status
of the country or industry at the time of rulemaking, and the
need for over- or under-protective regulation in light of the state
of public well-being and the environment at the time of
regulation.
CONCLUSION
Courts should continue to follow the deferential approach
used in EME Homer City Generation and Entergy to decide if
cost can be considered in environmental rulemaking. Prohibiting
or mandating cost consideration does not do service to the intent
of Congress's environmental regulation and needlessly causes
problems that otherwise would not exist. Environmentalist
groups and regulated industries would be much better served if
the EPA's expertise was deferred to instead of being limited to
one approach. Finally, members of the public would have a better
opportunity to learn how their health and surrounding
issId. at 10677-79.
15 9 Id.
iold. at 10674, 10676-77.
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environment are affected by the EPA's regulations, which would
concurrently be more appropriately designed and tailored for the
public's needs and for the benefit of their wellness and the
environment.
